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NOTES
RULE 10b-5 DAMAGE COMPUTATION:
APPLICATION OF FINANCIAL THEORY
TO DETERMINE NET ECONOMIC LOSS
INTRODUCTION
In Rule 10b-5 1 actions involving defrauded purchasers of actively
traded stocks, courts have generally adopted one of two damage
theories2 -gross economic loss 3 or net economic loss. 4 The gross loss
theory awards the plaintiff the total dollar decline in the price of the
1. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
2. Few actions under Rule 10b-5 go to judgment. See Mullaney, Theories of
Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 277, 277-78 (1977); Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in 10b-5
Cases, 31 Bus. Law. 1839, 1839 (1976). Nevertheless, damage measures are discussed
in other contexts, including class certification orders, see Wolgin v. Magic Marker
Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1979), and approval of class action settlements,
see Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bonime v. Doyle,
416 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977). In any case, the damage award is limited to
"actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976) (§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934); see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
3. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 603-04 (2d Cir.
1978); Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-62 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167,
1173 (2d Cir. 1970); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 305 F. Supp. 489, 496-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
4. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 553-56 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 & n.21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); Beissinger v. Rockwood
Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 787-90 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Steinberg v. Carey, 470
F. Supp. 471, 476-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924
(1977). This Note adopts a definition of net economic loss that encompasses a number
of damage measures and that differs slightly from the definitions employed by
various courts. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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stock between the date of purchase and either the date of resale of the
stock5 or the date of disclosure of the fraud.6 This is a rescissory
measure of damages, 7 usually reserved for situations in which either
privity8 or a fiduciary relationship 9 exists between the plaintiff and
defendant. By contrast, the net loss theory excludes from the recovery
those losses unrelated to the substance of the fraud, such as those
resulting from general market forces affecting the value of the stock. 10
This theory is usually applied in situations in which a fraud perpe-
trated upon the general public has had an impact on the market price
of the stock."
5. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.21 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); see Clark v.
John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1978); Marbury Mgm't,
Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Steinberg
v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
6. At the time of disclosure, the plaintiff makes a "second investment decision"
either to hold the shares or to sell them. The plaintiff is considered to have sold the
stock on the date of disclosure or within a reasonable time thereafter in order to
mitigate his damages. Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198-1200
(8th Cir. 1978); see Foster v. Financial Technology Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th
Cir. 1975). The term "date of disclosure" in this Note thus encompasses the actual
date of disclosure or a reasonable time thereafter.
7. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.21 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); Koenig v.
Smith, 88 F.R.D. 604, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see Clark v. John Lamula Investors,
Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 604 (2d Cir. 1978).
8. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Mullaney, supra note
2, at 285; Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 371, 376 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Actively
Traded Securities].
9. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
in part,-rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); see Koenig v. Smith, 88
F.R.D. 604, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mullaney, supra note 2, at 285; Actively Traded Securities, supra
note 8, at 376-77.
10. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1980)
(court excluded losses stemming from market forces); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,898, at 95,702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (total
loss excluded as unrelated to fraud), aff'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 791, 795 n.8
(2d Cir. 1980); Rubenstein v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 346 (N.D.
Tex. 1976) (damage award would eliminate "general market depreciation"); Entin v.
Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (purchaser not held "harmless against
losses due to general market declines"). But see Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.,
583 F.2d 594, 604 (2d Cir. 1978) (court declined to exclude losses resulting from
general market forces).
11. Koenig v. Smith, 88 F.R.D. 604, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see Beissinger v.
Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Steinberg v.
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Computation of damages under the gross loss theory is relatively
easy-it is simply the difference between the market price on the date
of purchase and the market price on the date of disclosure 12 or re-
sale. 13 Under the net loss theory, however, the computation is some-
what complex. The difficulty arises because estimates of the value of
the stock had the fraud not occurred are required to determine the
damage award. These estimates are not readily available from the
market place; they are hypothetical values which must be derived
specifically for the litigation. 14 These estimated values should take into
account the general market forces that may affect the price of stocks
independently of the fraud.'-
Many courts have rejected the gross loss theory in cases involving
frauds on the market 16 because the theory does not accurately indicate
Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec.
Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (gross loss used for fraud on
market).
12. See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978);
Foster v. Financial Technology Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975). See supra
note 6.
13. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.21 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); see Clark v.
John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 603-04 (2d Cir. 1978); Steinberg v.
Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See supra note 5.
14. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 1980);
Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d
554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977). But see Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). Despite the presence of a
fairly complicated class action fraud, the Blackie court was confident that the jury
would be able to "trace a graph delineating the actual value of the stock throughout
the class period." Id. at 909 n.25. Nevertheless, the court provided no guidance for
derivation of that graph. Id.
15. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Beissinger v. Rockwood
Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F.
Supp. 1372, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afj'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 924 (1977); Polin v. Conductron Corp., 411 F. Supp. 698, 702-03 (E.D.
Mo. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Feder-
man v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,418, at 99,114 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Black v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 401
F. Supp. 693, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 12 n.22
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
16. Cases concerning fraud on an individual, such as those involving a broker
and his customer, have been held to be an exception to the application of the net loss
measure. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, that measure has
been advocated for these situations as well. Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d
705, 716-23 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); see
[Vol. 51
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the loss caused specifically by the fraud. Instead they have attempted
to formulate methods for measuring damages which will yield awards
consistent with the underlying theory of net loss- compensating the
plaintiff for all losses stemming from the fraud while not making the
defendant an insurer against market-related risks.17
Part I of this Note analyzes the net economic loss theory of dam-
ages. Two general categories of net loss awards are analyzed-those
based on an out-of-pocket measure and those based on a proximate
cause measure. The differences between these two categories are dis-
cussed in the context of two hypothetical frauds, one of which has its
full impact on the value of the stock immediately, the other of which
has a long-term impact on value because events relating to the fraud
occur prior to disclosure.
Part II of this Note then analyzes various procedures presently used
to measure a plaintiff's net loss and concludes that they do not accu-
rately determine the plaintiff's net economic loss. Part III proposes
alternative methods for computing damages, based upon financial
theories, that will eliminate the difficulties inherent in existing meth-
ods. This Note contends that adoption of these proposed methods will
yield an award that is more consistent with the goals of the net loss
theory. Additionally, their adoption will allow the computation of the
damage award to be made by a special master or expert,' leaving the
issue of liability to be resolved by the trier of fact.
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980). These cases are
similar to actions against brokers for the sale of unsuitable securities in that the stocks
purchased do not possess the investment characteristics desired by the plaintiff. A
type of net loss award has been utilized by courts in these situations. The award to
the plaintiff is the difference between the actual value of the plaintiff's holdings and
the value of the plaintiff's holdings had the proper stocks been selected. Both values
are measured at the date of the discovery of the fraud. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppen-
heimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1981); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., 79
F.R.D. 246, 262-63 (N.D. Cal. 1978). For a discussion of proposed measurement
techniques applicable to these situations, see infra note 122.
17. See Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372,
1383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
924 (1977).
As stated by Dean Prosser, the net loss measure is the "hornbook law" for fraud
actions: "[If false statements are made in connection with the sale of corporate stock,
losses due to a subsequent decline of the market, or insolvency of the corporation,
brought about by business conditions or other factors in no way related to the
representations, will not afford any basis for recovery." W. Prosser, Law of Torts
§ 110, at 732 (4th ed. 1971).
18. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 540, 533 (5th Cir. 1981),
ajf'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Tucker v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
1983]
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I. THE NEr ECONOMIC Loss THEORY
A. The Rationale of Net Economic Loss
Upon entering the securities market, an investor assumes the risks
inherent in that market and must bear the losses stemming there-
from. 19 These risks exist because of unpredictable forces that affect the
market in general, such as interest rates, domestic and international
crises and unemployment. The net loss measure attempts to exclude
from any damage award those declines in market price that are
caused by general market forces and which are not related to the
fraud.2 0 This is based upon the belief that
one should be held liable only for the foreseeable consequences of
one's actions. Where the purchase of stock is induced through a
misrepresentation, one [should be] chargeable only for conse-
quences flowing from that statement; [and should] not thereby
become an insurer of the investment, responsible for an indefinite
period of time for any and all manner of unforeseen difficulties
which may eventually beset the stock.2'
19. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Green v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring);
Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see
Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd mem., 556 F.2d
554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977). Contra Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus &
Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977) (fraud on individual, gross loss measure
used), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); Gottreich v. San Francisco Inv. Corp., 552
F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
20. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
21. Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); see Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Bonime v.
Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
The gross economic loss measure, by contrast, "is based upon the proposition that
damages for securities fraud are determined in accordance with the extent to which
false and misleading information actually harmed the complaining party." Shapiro
v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1079 (1981). Another rationale used in support of gross loss is that because
the defendant's act was a precondition of the transaction, he should be accountable
for the entire loss. See Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 710 n.3 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). The standard for finding this precondition
varies. Gross loss has been awarded when the plaintiff would not have purchased at
any price, see Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 476 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), or
upon a more liberal standard, requiring only that the plaintiff might never have
invested, see Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Finally, the
gross loss measure is based on the theory that "the original fraud continues to be
operative until such time as it is discovered by the plaintiff and he has an opportunity
to dispose of his securities." I F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 7.15, at 600
(1956).
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Collateral reasons also require the use of the net loss measure as
opposed to the gross loss measure. One danger of using the gross loss
measure is that the damage award may have no relationship to the
wrong committed, so that a relatively minor offense can result in large
damage awards. 22 This danger does not exist when the net loss mea-
sure is used.
In addition, the net loss measure is preferable because it makes the
remedy for the implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5 comparable
to the statutory remedy provided by section 11 of the Securities Act of
193323 for similar offenses. 24 Section 11 contains a causation defense
that specifically excludes from the damage award all losses that the
defendant can demonstrate were not caused by his wrongful con-
duct. 25 Application of the gross loss measure to a Rule 10b-5 action
can result in a large damage award that would have been unavailable
had the same action been brought under section 11. Because the same
conduct may give rise to liability under both section 11 and Rule 10b-
5,26 the remedies provided under each should be similar. A more
liberal rule of damages in Rule 10b-5 actions, however, would encour-
22. Mullaney, supra note 2, at 278; see Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). It would be possible for
a relatively minor offense to result in a large damage award simply because the fraud
occurred during a declining market and for a major fraud to result in little or no
liability because it occurred during a rising market. In the latter situation, companies
would be able to reduce liability simply by delaying disclosure until they felt that the
market had peaked. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 357 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 n.7
(N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1974).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
24. See 5B A. Jacobs, The Impact of Rule 10b-5, § 260.03[f][iii], at 11-118
(1980). Compare Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) (relates to any fraud in
connection with a security) with the Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1976) (fraud in a registration statement).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976). Section 11 provides in pertinent part:
[I]f the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents
other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such
part of the registration statement, with repect to which his liability is
asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,
such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable.
Id. At least one court has specifically used the § 11 definition of causation in a Rule
lOb-5 action. Entin v. Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1976). The ALI Federal
Securities Code takes this same approach to a causation defense for misrepresenta-
tions or omissions presently actionable under Rule 10b-5. See Federal Securities Code
§ 202(19) comment 6(a) (1981).
26. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); see Federman v.
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,418, at 99,113 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Reder, supra note 2, at 1839-40.
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age the use of the implied remedy to circumvent the express limita-
tions set forth by Congress.27
Finally, the net loss award is preferred because it allows the plain-
tiff to recover his losses due to the fraud regardless of subsequent
changes in market price. A plaintiff may thus sell his stock at a profit
and still be entitled to recovery, a result not possible under the gross
loss measure. 28 Just as a plaintiff may not recover losses not caused by
the fraud, a defendant should not be afforded a reduction in his
liability simply because his fraud occurred during a rising market. 29
B. Net Loss Measures
Net loss may be measured in one of two ways-either by an out-of-
pocket measure 30 or by a proximate cause measure. 31 For plaintiffs
27. Reder, supra note 2, at 1839-40.
28. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir.
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 770, 789-90 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Comment, Remedies for Private Parties Under
Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 337, 349-50 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Remedies for Private Parties].
29. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 n.10 (9th Cir.
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger
v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
The out-of-pocket measure is best applied using the "value-line" framework devel-
oped by Judge Sneed in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-
46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). The "value-line" method requires the
establishment, for the period between the date of the fraud and the date of disclo-
sure, of a "price line" and a "value line" reflecting the market price and true value of
the stock for each day. The damage award under this method is the difference
between the price-value spread on the date of purchase and the spread on the date of
resale or disclosure. This method resolves several of the problems arising from the use
of the rescissory measure. First, it provides a proper computation of damages for
those plaintiffs who have sold prior to disclosure. Additionally, because this method
does not use only price differentials, it resolves another problem that exists with the
rescissory measure-preclusion of recovery when the resale price or the price on the
date of disclosure exceeds the purchase price. Id. at 1345-46 (Sneed, J., concurring).
This method has been adopted by a number of courts in class actions. See, e.g.,
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555-56 & n.36 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger v.
Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 788-89 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 148-49 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Wolgin v. Magic Marker
Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
31. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 51 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir.) (Meskill,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer
Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp.
1062, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
While Rule 10b-5 "does not explicitly require a showing of causation," Project,
Recent Developments in Securities Law: Causes of Action Under Rule 10b-5, 26
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Buffalo L. Rev. 503, 531 (1977), the courts have implied such an element, id.; see
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp.
770, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Causation arises in two different contexts-proving a cause
of action and obtaining damages. Reder, supra note 2, at 1847. This has been
translated into two distinct elements: reliance and causation of damages. Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1982). The causal relationship between the defendant's
acts and the plaintiff's loss that must be demonstrated to prove reliance is different
from the causal relationship that must be shown to obtain damages. See 5B A.
Jacobs, supra note 24, § 260.03[f][ii], at 11-111 to 11-112; 5A A. Jacobs, Litigation
and Practice Under Rule 10b-5, § 64.02, at 3-328 (2d ed. 1982).
The reliance element may be judged in general terms by whether the plaintiff
would have been influenced to act differently had he known the undisclosed or
misrepresented information. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). This has been labeled "transaction causa-
tion." Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 & n.l1 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-
5, 9 Sec. Reg. L.J. 99, 101 (1981). Proof of reliance determines if the fraud was the
"cause in fact" of the transaction. See Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832,
836 n.12 (3d Cir. 1974); Werfel v. Kramarsky, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Reliance may be presumed in certain situations, such as in omission cases, if the
omission involved a material fact. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Under the "fraud on the market" theory accepted in some
circuits, plaintiffs are presumed to have relied on the assumption that the market
price has been validly set. See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d
341, 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Note, The Reliance Require-
ment in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 584, 592-96 (1975).
Once the reliance element is satisfied, the plaintiff must then prove that his loss was
caused by the fraud. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). This type
of causation has been labeled "loss causation." Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Crane, supra, at
120.
There are two lines of authority regarding causation of damages. See Federal
Securities Code § 202(19) comment 3(c) (1981). One equates "causation in fact" and
"loss causation," see Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895,
904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and another employs a proximate cause test for the damage
award, see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970); Miller v. Sch-
weickart, 413 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Courts that accept "causation in
fact" as proof of loss causation are in effect combining the reliance and damage
elements of the cause of action and awarding gross loss. All that must be shown to
recover under this theory is proof of transaction causation and a change in the price
of the stock following the transaction; the loss and the fraud need not be related. See
Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1975); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172-
73 (2d Cir. 1970); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This
measure of damages has been criticized by judges and commentators. See, e.g.,
Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541
F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); Mullaney, supra note 2, at
287-88; Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1370 (1965).
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who hold their stock until disclosure of the fraud, the out-of-pocket
award is the difference between the price paid and the true value on
the date of purchase.32 Plaintiffs who sell prior to disclosure receive
the same award less the difference between price received and actual
value upon resale-the portion of the loss recovered from the mar-
ket. 33 A proximate cause award attempts to compensate the plaintiff
Courts adopting the traditional proximate cause test for proving damages in fraud
actions set a different standard of proof for reliance, and award damages only for
losses caused by the fraud-the plaintiff's net loss. See Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (out-of-pocket measure awarded), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,898, at 95,702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(no damages awarded), aff'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 791, 795 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980);
Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 941-42 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (same),
aff'd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975). This net loss award has been criticized. See
Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 710 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980).
32. Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 383; see
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). The actual
computation is the price-value spread on the date of purchase less that spread on the
date of disclosure. This latter spread, however, is assumed to be zero. See infra note
49.
The market price and the true value of a stock are distinguishable. See Beecher v.
Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Price will equal value when all
relevant information relating to a stock is known by the public. See Klapmeier v.
Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 482 F.2d 247, 252 (8th Cir. 1973). When this is not the case,
the price of the stock will diverge from the value of the stock. This assumes an
efficient market: "In a market that prices securities efficiently, prices at any point in
time are said to 'fully reflect' all available information that is relevant to the determi-
nation of values." S. Tinic & R. West, Investing in Securities: An Efficient Markets
Approach § 5.2, at 94 (1979).
The three forms of market efficiency-weak, semistrong and strong-each repre-
sents a different definition of what comprises the set of information that is fully
reflected in the price. The weak form includes all information about past market
behavior. The semistrong form includes information about past market behavior as
well as all public information about the economy, industries and information re-
leased by the company itself. The strong form includes all of this information plus
information that may not be publicly available. Id. § 5.5, at 98-99; see Barry, The
Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1307, 1330-54
(1981). The damage measurement procedures proposed herein incorporate the semis-
trong form of efficiency, which has been supported by financial research. See S.
Tinic & R. West, supra, § 18.2, at 498-508; Verecchia, On the Theory of Market
Information Efficiency, 1 J. Acct. & Econ. 77, 77 (1979). See infra note 76. Contra
Barry, supra, at 1342 (semistrong form criticized). The existence of the strong form
has been questioned in financial research. See S. Tinic & R. West, supra, § 18.2, at
509-12. Additionally, acceptance of the strong form would preclude any recovery
because, by definition, the market price would reflect the true information even
though it was not disclosed or had been misrepresented by the company.
33. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344-46 (9th Cir.
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). See supra note 30.
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for losses sustained to the extent that the substance of the misrepresen-
tation or omission "touches upon the reasons for the investment's
decline in value." 34 This may require that damages be computed using
price and value amounts on dates subsequent to the purchase date,
when events relating to the fraud have caused a decline in value.3 5
Courts fail to distinguish, however, between these two measures of
net loss, stating that the out-of-pocket measure determines those losses
that are proximately caused by the fraud.3 6 This will not always be an
accurate characterization of the effect of the measures because they
may sometimes produce different damage estimates. Differences may
occur when fraud-related events have an impact on the value of the
stock prior to disclosure. While the effect of one type of fraud is fully
reflected in the value of the stock on the initial date of the fraud, 37
that of another type of fraud is not totally reflected in the value of the
stock until some time later.38
Two hypothetical examples illustrate this proposition.3 9 Assume
that W purchases the stock of a chemical company which three years
earlier had reported that it would have to spend $100 million over the
next ten years to comply with environmental regulations. At the time
34. Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); accord Chemetron Corp. v. Business
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F.
Supp. 770, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,898, at 95,702-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aJ-'d on other grounds,
623 F.2d 791, 795 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84-85
(M.D. Fla. 1977); Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,418, at 99,114 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Tucker v.
Arthur Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 41-42.
36. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger v.
Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 787-88 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
37. Although the fraud itself may have its full impact on the day it is committed,
in subsequent days general market forces will affect the stock as it is perceived due to
the fraud, rather than affecting it as it would have been perceived had the fraud not
been committed. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 &
n.7 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134,
149 (N.D. Tex. 1980). See infra note 77.
38. See, e.g., Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 594-98 (8th Cir. 1960)
(fraudulent misrepresentation as to profitability of business); Green v. Jonhop, Inc.,
358 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Or. 1973) (misrepresentation relating to earnings predic-
tions); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 87-94, 159 N.E. 870, 871-73
(1928) (misrepresentations with respect to safety of bonds).
39. The first example was presented in Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 1
(1982). The second example was developed for the purposes of this Note.
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of W's purchase, the stock is selling for $30 per share on the stock
exchange. One month later the company announces that instead of
the original $100 million to comply with these regulations it expects to
spend $1 billion, an amount which it was fully aware of at the time of
the original report. The stock then falls to $20 per share. In this
situation, the fraud had its full effect on the value of the stock on the
date of purchase, because the company's misrepresentation resulted in
a one-time artificial inflation in the value of the stock and no related
events occurred prior to disclosure. In this instance, the out-of-pocket
and proximate cause measures will be equivalent 40 because the full
effect of the fraud can be measured at the date of purchase. Under
each measure, the plaintiff recovers $10 per share. For purposes of this
Note, this is labeled a Type I fraud.
By contrast, the two measures can yield different awards when the
full effect of the fraud occurs some time after the date of purchase.
Assume for example that an oil company owning one oil field obtains,
but does not release, information that the probability of striking oil is
not the 50 % it had originally estimated and released to the public
during the past year, but rather only 20 %. The stock price on the date
that the company receives this new estimate is $30 per share at which
time X and Z purchase stock. Three months later, X sells his stock. Six
months later, while Z still owns his stock, all of the wells on the field
come up dry and the stock price falls to zero. Assume also that had the
later estimate been released when it became available, the stock price
would have fallen to $15, reflecting the decreased probability of a
successful strike. The price would not have fallen to zero, however, as
there would still have been a chance for a successful well.
The appropriate award for X is an out-of-pocket measure. An
award based on proximate cause would be inaccurate because the
event further affecting the value of the stock-the ultimate failure of
the wells-did not occur during the period of X's ownership. 41 His
actual recovery is dependent upon the effect of market forces on the
true value of the stock during this period. Thus, with respect to X this
is a Type I fraud. For Z, however, who held the stock beyond the
occurrence of the event and until disclosure, the out-of-pocket award
would be the difference between the true value of the stock on the
40. The out-of-pocket measure and the proximate cause measure will yield iden-
tical awards only in the absence of market forces. In the presence of market forces,
the awards yielded by the two measures will differ because the measurement of the
spread between price and value is done on different days. The out-of-pocket measure
determines the spread on the date of purchase and the proximate cause measure
determines the spread on the date of disclosure. In the absence of market forces, the
gross loss measure will yield the same award as the two net loss measures because the
assumption underlying a date of disclosure valuation is the absence of market forces.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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date of the purchase and the price paid-$15 per share. A proximate
cause measure would properly award to Z his total loss, in this in-
stance $30 per share, because the substance of the fraud "touched
upon" the event resulting in the total decline. 42 This fraud relates to
the probability of a future event occurring. If this future event be-
comes a certainty prior to disclosure of the fraud, the total decline in
the value of the stock due to this change in the underlying value of the
company relating to the substance of the fraud should be included in
the damage award. This situation is labeled a Type II fraud for
purposes of this Note.
Courts awarding damages in Rule lOb-5 actions have used numer-
ous measures to do so, and have characterized these awards as based
upon "proximate cause, ' 43 "out-of-pocket, ' 44 or "net economic
42. In a situation similar to the oil company example, the court suggested award-
ing to a plaintiff holding partnership shares at disclosure the difference between the
price paid and the price of the shares had the truth concerning the investment been
known. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 191 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 938 (1982). This is not consistent with the principle of proximate cause,
which requires the plaintiff be awarded all losses that are a natural and proximate
consequence of the act complained of. See Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586,
592, 594-95 (8th Cir. 1960); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 87-94, 159
N.E. 870, 871-73 (1928).
The proximate cause measure is presently employed by courts in actions against
brokers for fraud against an individual. These courts award the difference between
the price of the stock and how the stock "would have fared in the absence of. . .such
misconduct." Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1981); see
Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th
Cir. 1981) (action against broker for inducing customer to take on excess risk); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (action against
broker for mismanagement of portfolio); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., 79 F.R.D.
246, 262-63 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (action brought under Investment Advisors Act of 1940
in which court constructed index of suitable securities to compare to actual holdings);
cf. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-87
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (action under § 11 of Securities Act of 1933 for misrepresentation in
registration statement). See supra note 16. It has also been suggested that a post-
transaction valuation, limiting a defendant's liability to plaintiffs owning stock at
disclosure to the loss in value directly related to the fraud, "is no more than a
disguised date-of-transaction test." Crane, supra note 31, at 135-36. This may be the
result in a Type I fraud, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text, but not in
frauds in which an event relating to the fraud has caused a change in value following
the transaction.
43. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir.
1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger
v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 777-78 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The
characterization, however, does not always match the nature of the award. See supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Mgm't Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 617-18 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414,
422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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loss."' 45 Regardless of the characterization, however, the awards con-
stitute attempts by courts to reimburse the plaintiff for net losses
caused by the defendant's fraud. The definition of net economic loss
adopted in this Note encompasses all of these measures. Net economic
loss is defined as that loss stemming from the substance of the fraud,
not including those losses arising from non-fraud related factors. This
definition is consistent with the purpose of these measures-"to calcu-
late the amount of damages based upon [those] losses that are truly
attributable to the fraud." 46
II. NET Loss MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES
A variety of procedures have been used or suggested for the valua-
tion of stocks under the net loss measure when the market price fails to
reflect true value. Analysis of these methods, however, reveals flaws
which prevent them from yielding a true net loss.
A. Valuation Using Basic Financial Theories
1. Intrinsic Valuation
A basic method of valuing a company's stock on the date of pur-
chase for purposes of an out-of-pocket award is intrinsic valuation. 47 A
general definition of intrinsic value is "that value which is justified by
the facts, e.g., assets, earnings, dividends, definite prospects, includ-
ing the factor of management."' 48 In other words, arriving at intrinsic
value at the time of purchase essentially involves a general analysis of
the company. 49 The estimate of value may be stated either as an
45. E.g., Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 604 (2d Cir.
1978); Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afj'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980); see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.
1980).
46. Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980); see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978), modified, 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 576-77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F.
Supp. 507, 515-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 393 F.
Supp. 139, 144-50 (D. Conn. 1974), aJJ'd, 516 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1975); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 826 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963).
48. B. Graham, D. Dodd, S. Cottle, Security Analysis: Principles and Tech-
niques 28 (4th ed. 1962).
49. This type of technique is used to value stocks for estate and gift tax purposes.
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237. The Revenue Ruling outlines an approach to
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estimate of the value itself during a discrete time period, 50 or as a
percentage of the market price during that period.-"
The intrinsic method, however, is both inaccurate and subjective.52
Because the estimate is based upon a large number of variables, many
of which cannot be measured accurately, a precise determination of
valuation that bases the estimate of value on "all the relevant facts, . . . elements of
common sense, informed judgement and reasonableness." Id. at 238. The ruling lists
and explains some of the factors that may be considered in making the valuation. Id.
at 238-42.
The Treasury Regulations that relate to this Revenue Ruling outline a procedure to
estimate stock value which is based upon market prices rather than intrinsic valua-
tion. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2 (1982). This estimate is a weighted average computed
using the market prices of the stock on the closest dates before and after the transac-
tion which were not affected by the fraud. These market prices reflect the true value
of the security on that date. Id. An example from the regulations clarifies the
procedure:
Assume that sales of X Company common stock nearest the valuation date
(Friday, June 15) occurred two trading days before (Wednesday, June 13)
and three trading days after (Wednesday, June 20) and on these days the
mean sale prices per share were $10 and $15, respectively. The price of $12
is taken as representing the fair market value of a share of X Company
common stock as of the valuation date
[(3 x 10) + (2 x 15)]/5.
Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(3).
An approach similar to that of the Treasury Regulations was adopted by the
plaintiffs in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the expert witness
constructed a linear "value-line" for the time period between a date prior to the
fraud and the date of disclosure. Id. at 130-31; Memorandum for Plaintiff, exhibits
148 & 152, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(exhibits later found to be relevant only to a previously dismissed claim, court
therefore disregarded). The approach suggested by the plaintiffs is theoretically
incorrect. The behavior of stocks is not linear; daily price fluctuations are somewhat
random. See generally Kuehner, Efficient Markets and Random Walk, in Financial
Analyst's Handbook 1226, 1234-58 (S. Levine ed. 1975). In order to be accurate, the
"value-line" should reflect these fluctuations. Furthermore, the "value-line" theory
suggested by the plaintiffs fails to recognize the daily shifts in the market and assumes
a gradual impact of an immediate and total disclosure on the value of the stock. But
the market, in fact, will impute the truth into the price of the stock almost immedi-
ately. See Aharony & Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and
Stockholders' Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. Fin. 1, 6 (1980); Hillmer & Yu,
The Market Speed of Adjustment to New Information, 7 J. Fin. Econ. 321, 338
(1979). But see Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 414-15 (1970) (market may take up to four days to adjust to
new information).
50. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 826 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
51. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 576-77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 86 (1982).
52. See Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 826 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aff'd, 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); F.H. O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of
Business Associates-"Squeeze-Outs" in Small Enterprises § 2.16, at 35 (1961).
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value is almost impossible. 3 In addition, estimates of the intrinsic
value usually are made for long, discrete periods, and consequently do
not reflect the daily fluctuations in value that most stocks experience
during those periods.5 4 This problem is compounded in class actions,
in which large numbers of plaintiffs will have purchased the stock
over a long period of time. In computing the award, the class period
may be divided into several of these discrete periods of value estima-
tion. 55 As a result, class members who are involved in transactions
occurring only one day apart, and who pay the same price for stock
having virtually the same value on both days, may receive drastically
different damage awards because they fortuitously fall into different
periods of value estimation. 58
On the other hand, measurement of value in terms of percentage of
the market price appears to take into account day-to-day fluctuations
because the estimate of value fluctuates along with the market price.
Fluctuating estimates of value, however, are the result of market
forces affecting the company as it is perceived due to the fraud, rather
than the result of those forces as they would have affected the com-
pany had all the relevant facts been disclosed. The fluctuations in the
perceived value thus fail to represent changes in the true value. Fur-
thermore, the percentage of market price estimate is as speculative as
the direct estimate.5 7 Finally, estimates of percentage of market value
are also for discrete periods of time,58 so that estimates of value, and
thus damage awards, may change significantly from one period to the
next as the percentage estimate changes.5
2. Projected Earnings and Dividends
The intrinsic valuation may be refined by basing the valuation
upon the projected stream of earnings or dividends as estimated at the
53. See Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 938 (1971); Remedies for Private Parties, supra note 28, at 341.
54. Hagaman & Jensen, Investment Value and Security Analysis, 33 Fin. Ana-
lysts J. 63, 64 (Mar.-Apr. 1977).
55. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 86 (1982).
56. Cf. id. at 576-77 (disparate results using percentage of market price as
estimate). See infra note 59.
57. The estimate based on percentage of market price is simply another way of
expressing the intrinsic value of the company. It is based upon the same factors as a
direct statement of value. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
58. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 576-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 86 (1982).
59. Id. Two of the valuation periods in Sirota were May 5, 1967-June 5, 1968
and June 6, 1968-May 22, 1969. The jury found that the price was inflated 33%
during the first period and 54.2% during the second period. Id. The closing price on
June 5, 1968 was $45.25 per share, and on June 6, 1968 was $46.875 per share. ISL
Daily Stock Price Index, American Stock Exchange 194 (Apr.-June 1968). The dam-
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time of purchase.A0 These projections are made using a variety of
techniques, including probabilistic forecasting, growth models and
computer models.6' They are then discounted to the then present
value using an appropriate capitalization rate to derive an estimated
value of the stock for various discrete periods during the fraud.62
A problem with this method is that both the estimate of future
earnings and the capitalization rate are speculative.6 3 Actual earnings
figures for the capitalization period cannot be used because the valua-
tion is to be made from the perspective of the date of purchase, when
these future earnings were uncertain.6 4 Additionally, because esti-
mates of earnings and dividends generally do not vary significantly
from day to day during these discrete periods, the estimate of value
will remain constant.6 5 The problems that inhere in the estimates with
respect to intrinsic valuation thus apply as well to this type of valua-
tion.66
3. Price/Earnings Ratios
Another method to estimate value utilizing earnings involves the use
of a price/earnings (P/E) ratio. 7 This value is the price per share of
age award for a plaintiff purchasing stock on June 5 would thus be $15.08 per share
(33% of market price). The damage award for a plaintiff purchasing on June 6
would be $25.41 per share (54.2% of market price). 673 F.2d at 576-77.
60. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 515-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977); Simon v. New Haven & Carton Co., 393 F. Supp. 139, 144-50 (D.
Conn. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1975); see 5B A. Jacobs, supra note 24,
§ 260.03[i][iv], at 11-168; W. Sharpe, Investments 366-71 (2d ed. 1981); cf. Note,
Developments in the Law-Damages, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 125 & n.122 (1947)
(discussing capitalization of the earning power of a sunken barge to estimate its
value).
61. Cohen, Analysis of Common Stock, in Financial Analyst's Handbook 134,
167 (S. Levine ed. 1975).
62. Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 393 F. Supp. 139, 148-49 (D. Conn.
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1975); F. Amling, Investments 196-98 (4th ed.
1978); D. Bellemore, H. Phillips & J. Ritchie, Investment Analysis and Portfolio
Selection: An Integrated Approach 110-15 (1979); Hagaman & Jensen, supra note 54,
at 64; Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968
Wash. U.L.Q. 165, 173 & n.46 [hereinafter cited as Measurement of Damages]. The
discounted dividends will produce a direct estimate of value, but the discounted
earnings must be multiplied by an appropriate price/earnings ratio. For a discussion
of these ratios, see infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
63. See Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsidiary Mer-
gers, 4 J. Corp. L. 63, 76-77 (1978) (earnings estimates and capitalization rate);
Measurement of Damages, supra note 62, at 173-74 (earnings estimates). Advanced
techniques are avaliable to estimate earnings. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 167-71.
64. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); 5B A. Jacobs, supra note 24, § 260.03[i][i], at 11-159.
65. See F. Amling, supra note 62, at 195, 387.
66. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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stock divided by the earnings per share of the company. The ratio for
the period of the fraud is estimated by examining the company's
historical P/E ratio as well as the current PIE ratios of similar com-
panies.6 8 The earnings per share during the period of the fraud are
then multiplied by the ratio to derive the estimated value. 9
This method has a number of problems. First, although it elimi-
nates uncertainty with respect to future earnings, the estimated PIE
ratio is speculative, as is demonstrated by the disagreements among
experts as to its value. 70 In addition, the true ratio fluctuates daily as
prices change, while the earnings figures in the denominator of the
ratio remain constant. 7 1 These daily fluctuations are not reflected by
the P/E estimates, which are fixed for extended periods. 72 Finally,
because the actual earnings figures will be available for discrete pe-
riods of time only, artificial distinctions will again be made between
plaintiffs perhaps only one day apart in their purchases.
B. Price Change on the Date of Disclosure
An additional attempt to measure the effect of the fraud on the
price of the stock involves using the change in the price of the stock on
the date that the fraud was disclosed. The value obtained is used as an
estimate of the spread between the distorted market price and the true
value of the stock over the period of time prior to disclosure. 73 This
method assumes that the price movement on the date of disclosure is
an adjustment by the market to reflect the new information.74 The
67. See, e.g., Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 562-63 (1st Cir. 1978); Chris-
Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in
part, revd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Simon v.
New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 393 F. Supp. 139, 144-48 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 516
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1975).
68. See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430
U.S. 1 (1977).
69. See Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 385 F. Supp. 245, 247-48
(E.D. Mich. 1974); W. Sharpe, supra note 60, at 375-76.
70. See Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 385 F. Supp. 245, 247-48
(E.D. Mich. 1974) (range of figures suggested by various experts); Chris-Craft Indus.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
71. See F. Amling, supra note 62, at 470 (P/E ratio is daily stock price divided by
current annual earnings).
72. The P/E ratio is calculated using the past year's or other interim earnings
figures. Cf. F. Amling, supra note 62, at 470 (uses projected earnings to predict
future price). The computation of PIE ratios appears daily in the financial sections of
most newspapers. E.g., Barron's, Jan. 3, 1983, at 53 (stock tables); N.Y. Times, Nov.
30, 1982, at D14, col. 1 ("Stock Tables Explained").
73. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976); Rubenstein v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 346
(N.D. Tex. 1976); Entin v. Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
74. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976).
COMPUTING 10b-5 DAMAGES
result is an out-of-pocket award in which each plaintiff who has
purchased during that period and who still holds stock on the date of
disclosure receives the amount of the price-value spread multiplied by
the number of shares purchased. 75
This measure also has a number of weaknesses. First, the market
may have anticipated the disclosure of the fraud, so that price move-
ments on previous days will have already incorporated some of the
correction. 76 Accordingly, the price change on the date of disclosure
may not totally reflect the effect of the fraud on the value of the stock.
Another problem with the measure is its assumption that the fraud
had a constant effect on the price of the stock during the time prior to
disclosure, resulting in a constant spread between price and value.
This assumption is invalid. The true spread may change because the
effect of general market forces upon the stock during the fraud is not
the same as it would have been were no fraud committed. 77 In other
words, the fraud affects the sensitivity of the stock to market forces.
The consequence of this assumed constant spread, however, is that
purchasers of the stock who have resold prior to disclosure are consid-
ered to have recovered from the marketplace the amount of which
they were defrauded at the time of purchase. These purchasers would
thus be precluded from any recovery even though they may have
75. See Entin v. Barg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
76. See Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J.L.
& Econ. 121, 139-40 (1981) (citing R. Kellogg, An Empirical Investigation of Disclo-
sure Error Civil Damage Lawsuits under the Federal Securities Laws (1980) (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Rochester, Grad. School of Mgm't)); Actively
Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 394 & n.121; cf. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll,
The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 Int'l Econ. Rev. 1, 20 (1969)
(adjustment to announcements of stock splits); Pettit, Dividend Announcements,
Security Performance, and Capital Market Efficiency, 27 J. Fin. 993, 1004 (1972)
(adjustment to dividend announcements).
77. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir.
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring):
A numerical example of subsequent events increasing the value of the mis-
representation is as follows. Assume Corporation C discloses the discovery of
X barrels of oil when, in fact, no oil was discovered at all. Further assume
that the per share value of X barrels of oil is $10. Following the false
disclosure the stock sells on the open market at $150 per share. At this point,
P purchases a share. Its true value is $140 ($150-$10). An oil embargo by
the OPEC nations is imposed thereafter, and as a result of the embargo, the
per share value of C's false disclosure increases to $25. The market value of
the stock, assuming no other changes in such value, now stands at $165. P
does not sell. In due course, the falsity of C's report is revealed and upon
disclosure the stock drops to $140, its true value all the time.
Id. at n.6 (Sneed, J., concurring). Judge Sneed's example apparently assumes that the
remainder of the company's business is unaffected by the oil embargo and other




actually suffered a compensable loss due to a narrowing of the market
price-true value spread from the date of purchase to the date of
disclosure.78
Although confining the measurement of damages to the date of
disclosure excludes from the award consideration of price changes
caused by general market forces prior to diclosure, the effect of these
forces persists, and may affect the price of the stock on the date of
disclosure. The entire price change on that date may not be attribut-
able to the fraud, thus distorting the damage award.79 Moreover, the
full effect of disclosure by the company may not take place on a single
day-the stock exchange may suspend trading for the day upon the
company's initial announcement concerning the fraud, or the disclo-
sure may be made in stages.8 0 In such a case the total effect of the
fraud will not be reflected on the date of initial disclosure, but rather
only when disclosure of all of the relevant facts is made."'
C. Harris Measure of Damages
The simplest method of estimating the value on the date of purchase
is that used by the court in Harris v. American Investment Co. 82 This
method is based upon the price of the stock following complete disclo-
sure, when price and value are assumed to coincide.8 3 Because that
78. See id. at 1346 (Sneed, J., concurring) (recovery possible using out-of-pocket
measure); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 789 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (same); In re LTV See. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 149 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (no
recovery under assumption of constant spread); cf. Remedies for Private Parties,
supra note 28, at 349-50 (no recovery using gross loss type of award when price at
disclosure exceeds purchase price).
79. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
80. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976); Rubenstein v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 337, 346
(N.D. Tex. 1976); Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 395 (describing release of information
relating to renowned Texas Gulf Sulphur fraud).
81. Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 394-95 & n.123.
82. 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). This case is
often cited as the leading authority in support of this method of damage computa-
tion. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 180 n.24 (8th Cir. 1982);
Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 68 (8th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924
(1977).
83. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976). The assumption that price and value converge within one day
has been supported by financial literature. See Aharony & Swary, supra note 49, at
6; Hillmer & Yu, supra note 49, at 336-37. But see Fama, supra note 49, at 414-15
(market may fail to adjust to new information within one day, but four-day period
will allow for full and accurate adjustment).
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price is considered the first valid post-purchase indicator of value, it is
used to estimate the value at the time of purchase. s4 An out-of-pocket
award in this context would give the plaintiff the difference between
the price he paid and this post-disclosure price. 5
The premise underlying this type of measure is that the post-disclo-
sure price is a valid estimate of the value on the date of purchase. This
premise in turn assumes that the true value of the stock remains
relatively constant for the duration of the fraud.8 6 This assumption,
however, is highly suspect. The longer the interval between the date
of purchase and the valuation date, the larger the potential inaccu-
racy.8 7 This is especially true in the present securities markets, which
have demonstrated a marked increase in volatility.88 As one analyst
noted: "Market moves that used to take place in a year now occur over
just two or three months."8 Given daily swings of up to 40 points on
the Dow Jones Industrial Average,9 ° a period of one day between the
purchase and valuation may produce an inaccurate estimate. More-
over, while the Harris measure has been characterized as yielding an
out-of-pocket award, in effect it awards the plaintiff rescissory dam-
ages.91 The plaintiff receives his gross loss-the difference between the
price paid and the price on the date of disclosure-with no adjust-
ments for external market forces. 92
Defects in existing methods of measuring damages have made possi-
ble awards that bear no relationship to the defendant's wrong. Tech-
84. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); 4 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud
& Commodities Fraud § 9.1, at 228 (1982).
85. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
86. See 5B A. Jacobs, supra note 24, § 260.03[i][ii], at 11-165 to 11-166.
87. Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 384-85. An obvious problem with
this measure is its exclusion of the possibility that a value from a date prior to the
fraud may be used to estimate true value, when in fact this date may be closer in time
to the date of purchase.
88. Arenson, Wall Street's Furious Swings, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1982, at Dl,
col. 3; Scholl, The Year's Action in the Dow: Wow!, Barron's, Jan. 3, 1983, at 18.
89. Arenson, supra note 88, at Dl, col. 3 (quoting Stanley B. Shopkorn, manag-
ing director at Salomon Brothers in charge of equity trading).
90. Id.
91, Schwarz & Kummer, Damages Under Federal Securities Laws, in New
Directions in Securities Litigation 461, 466 (S. Wechsler ed. 1976). For criticisms of
damage awards based upon the gross loss theory, see Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn,
629 F.2d 705, 719-20 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring); Mullaney, supra note 2, at 287-88; Painter, supra note 31, at
1370.
92. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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niques used by financial analysts, however, may be adapted to yield a
more accurate measurement of a plaintiff's net economic loss. At
present these theories are primarily used to evaluate securities for the
purpose of determining whether they are suitable for purchase. 93 The
analysis may readily be applied to damage calculations in Rule 10b-5
actions.
These methods produce estimates of value for each date during the
period that the fraud has affected the market, taking into account the
various forces that normally affect the price of the stock. By deriving
daily estimates of value, the spread between price and true value may
be calculated on a daily basis, thus enabling a court to calculate an
accurate out-of-pocket measure.9 4 Finally, the methods can be used to
compute the loss proximately caused by the fraud by estimating a
value of the stock at some post-purchase date that reflects the stock's
normal price level absent the fraud and fraud-related events.9 5
III. DAMAGE MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES
UTILIZING THE "MARKET MODEL"
Application of advanced financial theories to the area of damage
measurement in securities fraud has been virtually unexplored." One
commentator has proposed a damage measurement procedure in lOb-
5 actions based upon the Market Model,97 which represents the return
on a particular stock in terms of the return on the market in general.9 8
Although theoretically sound, this technique has not been adopted by
the courts,99 perhaps because of the level of financial sophistication
93. See Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and
Evidence (pt. 1), 30 Fin. Analysts J. 68, 68 (Mar.-Apr. 1974), reprinted in Financial
Analyst's Handbook 1296, 1296 (S. Levine ed. 1975).
94. See infra pt. III(A)-(B).
95. See infra pt. III(C)-(D).
96. See generally Fischel, supra note 39, at 17-19. Finance theories have, how-
ever, been applied to other aspects of a securities fraud action, such as the measure-
ment of the effect of stock splits, dividend announcements and mergers on the market
price of the stock. Id. at 17 & n.45.
97. E. Fama, Foundations of Finance 63-98 (1976); Fama, Risk, Return and
Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Comments, 23 J. Fin. 29, 37 (1968). The underlying
theories of the model were developed in Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77
(1952). For a simple presentation of the Market Model, see Modigliani & Pogue, An
Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence (pts. 1 & 2), 30 Fin.
Analysts J. 68, 76-79 (Mar.-Apr. 1974), 30 Fin. Analysts J. 69, 69-77 (May-June
1974), reprinted in Financial Analyst's Handbook 1296, 1311-27 (S. Levine ed.
1975).
98. Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 385-98. Proposed Method 1 and
the method described in Actively Traded Securities produce equivalent estimates of
value. Both are based upon the deviation between expected price as computed using
the Market Model and the actual price, attributing the total difference to the fraud.
99. Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, has been cited by courts as con-
structing a potential method of valuation. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) (apparently referring to
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necessary to compute the damage award. The methods proposed
herein have the same theoretical foundation, but the procedures in-
volved have been simplified in order that they may be used and
understood by both courts and practitioners.
A. Proposed Method 1
The first proposed method estimates the value of the stock on the
date of the purchase so that an out-of-pocket measure may be applied
to compute the damage award in all Type I frauds. 100 The method
utilizes the observable correlation, denominated as beta (13), between
the return on a stock and the return on the market,' 10 and if desired,
the return on the stocks within a particular industry 0 2 as represented
in the Market Model. 0 3 Once this correlation is determined, it is
possible to predict the return on the stock for a given level of return on
the market. The proposed method then derives the price on the date of
purchase that, given the price on the date of disclosure, would main-
tain that observed correlation. This procedure assumes that the beta
of the stock has remained constant over the time period. 0 4 The rela-
tionships are represented in an equation derived by performing a
regression analysis. 05
that Note in stating that value-line formation is possible); In re LTV See. Litig., 88
F.R.D. 134, 152 n.9 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
100. The values on dates subsequent to the date of purchase may also be computed
so that the value-line method presented by Judge Sneed may be used. See Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring).
101. The market portfolio in the Market Model consists of every risky asset in
proportion to its relative value in the total marketplace. Because such a portfolio is
not found in the real world, a stock index such as the Standard & Poor's 500 Common
Stock Index may be used as a surrogate. See S. Tinic & R. West, supra note 32,
§ 11.4, at 289-90.
102. This additional variable is used to fine tune the estimate by including factors
that may affect a particular industry but not the market as a whole, or that may
affect a particular industry more than the market in general. See S. Tinic & R. West,
supra note 32, § 7.3, at 171 n.5; Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 389. As
one commentator noted, the selection of only one industry may not produce an
accurate estimate:
A particular company may be well correlated with more than one industry,
in which case additional independent variables may be appropriately
added. In case of uncertainty over which industries are relevant to a con-
glomerate corporation, multiple regressions may be performed on all of the
plausibly relevant industries, individually as well as in the different possible
combinations, to determine the combination of market and industry indexes
with the highest correlation with the performance of the individual com-
pany.
Id. at 389 n.97.
103. See Fischel, supra note 39, at 18 & nn.47-48.
104. See E. Fama, supra note 97, at 132 (beta constant for up to seven years);
Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 388 & n.91 (beta constant over time).
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The regression equation 0 6 may be represented graphically as the
most explanatory line that may be drawn through a scatter of points-
Conceivably, however, beta may change as a result of changes in the company itself,
such as through mergers and diversification, or through changes in the sensitivity of
the business to market forces. To resolve this problem, beta can be determined from
investment fundamentals, such as variance of cash flow, variance of earnings and
current dividend yield. Rosenberg & Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment Fun-
damentals (pts. 1 & 2), 32 Fin. Analysts J. 60, 62 (May-June 1976), 32 Fin. Analysts
J. 62, 67 (July-Aug. 1976); see Marathe, Portfolio Beta Prediction, in The Investment
Manager's Handbook 202, 215 (S. Levine ed. 1980). Alternatively, beta may be
calculated utilizing accounting risk measures such as dividend payout, growth, lever-
age, liquidity, asset size, variability of earnings and covariability of earnings. Beaver,
Kettler & Scholes, The Association Between Market Determined and Accounting
Determined Risk Measures, 45 Acct. Rev. 654, 660 (1970); see Bowman, The Theo-
retical Relationship Between Systematic Risk and Financial (Accounting) Variables,
34 J. Fin. 617 (1979). But see Elgers, Accounting-Based Risk Predictions: A Re-
examination, 55 Acct. Rev. 389, 403 (1980) (accounting-based risk predictions of
beta not superior to market beta).
Because the financial variables are obtained through an ex post facto examination
of the company, beta can be calculated directly for the period of the fraud, rather
than by using historical betas as an estimate of beta during the fraud, even though
the fraud itself may have distorted the relationship between the return on the stock
and the return on the market. This method of calculating beta may also be used
when the fraud consists of a misrepresentation involving or related to one of the
financial variables, because the true values of these variables will be known when the
fraud is cured. Moreover, the method may be applied in situations in which the stock
does not trade on an exchange or if it has not been listed on an exchange for a
sufficient period to calculate beta using a regression analysis of returns on both the
stock and the market.
Finally, there are alternative theories of valuation that utilize multiple factors to
estimate value. See Roll & Ross, An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory, 35 J. Fin. 1073 (1980). These theories may be used in place of the Market
Model should they be shown to provide more accurate estimates.
105. For a more detailed discussion of regression analysis, see generally Fisher,
Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 702 (1980). Most
computer software packages include regression programs, which facilitate the deri-
vation of the equation. See, e.g., Statistical Analysis System (SAS) User's Guide 237-
63 (1979 ed.) (GLM (General Linear Models) procedure).
106. The formulas for deriving a linear regression equation are as follows:
13 = N[(Exy) - (Ey)(Ex)]
N(Ex) - (Ex)2
a = lEy - f3Ex
N
N = number of pairs of observations
x = return on the market per period
y = return on the stock per period
See F. Amling, supra note 62, at 322 n.l1.
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in this instance the line best representing the relationship between the
rates of return of the stock against rates of return on the market, for
various time periods. 0 7 The beta factor used in the equation may be
thought of as the slope of the line representing the relationship be-
tween the price movements of the stock and those of the market.
Thus, beta equals the expected percent increase in stock return for
each one percent increase in market return. 08
The data used in the regression analysis are the monthly returns of
the stock and the market for the five years prior to the initiation of the
fraud. 10 The basic formula is as follows: R, (return on the stock)
equals alpha (a constant) plus the product of beta and Rm (return on
the market). Thus,





107. Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 388 n.92.
108. Modigliani & Pogue (pt. 1), supra note 93, 30 Fin. Analysts J. at 76, re-
printed in Financial Analyst's Handbook at 1312.
109. See E. Fama, supra note 97, at 132. For a discussion of alternative means of
computing beta, as when a stock has not been traded on an exchange for five years,
see supra note 104.
110. Specifically: R, = Return on the stock; cc = alpha, a constant (y intercept);
i3 = beta, or regression coefficient; R. = Return of the market; and e = error of the
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Once the correlation between the return on the stock and the return
on the market is determined, the return on the security had the fraud
not occurred, R,, may be estimated for the period between the trans-
action and disclosure. This estimate is produced by inserting the
actual return on the market during the period between the purchase
and date of disclosure or resale, Rm, into the regression equation
derived above (eq. 1)."'
Once the estimated return on the stock, R., is determined, it may be
used to derive P,, the estimated value on the date of purchase, because
B, may also be stated in terms of stock prices and dividends. R, is equal
to the price following disclosure when price equals value, P, less the
estimated value on the date of purchase, P0, plus dividends, D, all
divided by P.. Thus,
1, = (P, - P0 + D)/P0  (eq. 2).112
Solving equation 2 for P0 results in P0 equaling the price paid plus
dividends, divided by the estimated return on the stock plus one:
P0 = (P, + D)/(Rs + 1) (eq. 3).
The damage award is then the difference between P0 and the price
paid for the stock. This value may be used with the out-of-pocket
measure in a Type I fraud." 3
regression. See Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 388. Alpha is a constant
equal to the average value of the unsystematic returns on the stock over time. These
returns depend on factors unique to the company, such as labor difficulties or the
resignation of the company's president. They are independent of the returns based
upon the relationship between the return of the market and the return on the stock as
measured by beta. Modigliani & Pogue (pt. 1), supra note 93, 30 Fin. Analysts J. at
77, reprinted in Financial Analyst's Handbook at 1311-12. E is epsilon, the error of
the regression, which is assumed to have a zero mean, Fischel, supra note 39, at 18
n.47, and is disregarded in the rest of this analysis.
111. Daily figures for the Standard & Poor's 500, which this Note utilizes as a
surrogate for the market, as well as other indices, are available in Standard & Poor's
Security Price Index Record, which is published annually.
112. See Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 387 n.87. The variables in
Proposed Method 1 are defined as follows: P, = market price of the stock when price
equals value following disclosure of the fraud; P0 = value of the stock on the date of
purchase; and D = dividends payable to stockholders during the period. Id. For a
discussion of determining when full disclosure is actually made, see supra notes 80-81
and accompanying text. For research on selection of a date following full disclosure
to determine P,, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
113. If disclosure is made following the occurrence of a related event-a Type II
fraud-Proposed Method 1 cannot be applied to estimate value. Method 1 utilizes a
true value of the stock at a post-disclosure date to obtain the estimated value. Once
the event occurs and is disclosed, either together with or prior to disclosure of the
fraud, the post-disclosure price will reflect the event as well as the fraud. Valuation
of the stock as it would have been had the fraud alone affected the price is thus
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B. Applying Proposed Method 1
Proposed Method 1 may be demonstrated by applying it to one of
the hypothetical frauds discussed in Part I of this Note.
Assume that the chemical company discussed in the example of a
Type I fraud releases a statement on July 29, 1966, just before the
market closes, that it will spend $100 million to comply with environ-
mental regulations. At the close of trading on that date the stock sells
for $30 per share. The stock continues to trade at prices consistent
with its performance during the past few years. No dividends are
payable to shareholders during the month. On September 1, 1966,
prior to the opening of the market, the company discloses that it will
in fact cost $1 billion to comply with the regulations, a fact which it
knew at the time of the initial disclosure. The stock price falls to $20
per share, which is assumed to be the true value of the stock on that
date.1 4 This will be P, in the equation. The hypothetical trading
prices for the company during the month that the fraud affected the
price may be seen in column I of Chart I in the Appendix.
The regression equation for the stock, equation 1, is assumed to be
R, = .0005 + 1.5Rm. 5 The value of the stock for each date during
the period is determined by first deriving the estimated return on the
stock, R,. This estimate in turn is derived by inserting the return on
the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index from each date until the date of
curative disclosure-September 1, 1966. These values may be seen in
column II of Chart I.
The estimated return for each date is inserted into equation 3 to
derive the value of the stock for each date. P, is the closing price of the
stock on the date of disclosure, $20 per share. For example, the
computation of the true value of the stock purchased by a plaintiff on
August 16 and retained until disclosure is as follows: Standard &
Poor's 500 on August 16 = 81.63; Standard & Poor's 500 on Septem-
ber 1 = 77.70; Rm between August 16 and September 1 = -4.81%.
Inserting Rm into the the regression equation produces R, = -7.17%.
This value is then used to compute P0 using equation 3.
P0 = 20/(-.0717 + 1)
= $21.54
impossible using this method. Any attempt at valuation would have to be made using
the techniques discussed in Part II, section A of this Note. While inaccurate, these are
the only methods that do not rely on the market price to determine the award and
thus separate the effects of the fraud and the event.
114. This assumes that price and value will coincide on the date of disclosure. It
may, however, take up to four days for the market price to incorporate the informa-
tion contained in the disclosure. See supra note 83.
115. These values are representative of actual oc and / values. See S. Tinic & R.
West, supra note 32, at 184-85; Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 391.
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The damage award for this plaintiff would thus equal $7.59 per share,
the difference between P0, $21.54, and the market price on that date,
$29.125.16 The hypothetical prices, estimated values and the spreads
between them for the period from the beginning of the fraud to the
date of curative disclosure, are indicated in Chart I.
C. Proposed Method 2
The second proposed method measures losses proximately caused by
frauds and related events, which result in declines in true value after
the date of purchase but prior to disclosure-a Type II fraud-for
plaintiffs who hold their stock until disclosure." 7 The appropriate
measure of damages in this situation is the difference between the
market price of the stock on the date of disclosure"" and the value of
the stock on that date had both the fraud and the event upon which it
"touches" not occurred." 9 Awarding to the plaintiff in this instance
the difference between purchase price and the price on date of disclo-
sure would indemnify the plaintiff against all market risks. Losses due
to general market forces are thus factored out of the award as they are
accounted for in both values used in the proposed computation. In
order to compute the hypothetical value of the stock on the date of
disclosure, the Market Model used in Proposed Method 1 is applied. 120
116. The damage award for plaintiffs who sell prior to disclosure is the price/value
spread on the date of purchase less the price/value spread on the date of sale. See
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring).
117. The proximate cause award is preferred for this type of plaintiff because the
substance of the fraud "touches upon" the reasons for the stock's decline in value
subsequent to the purchase. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549
(5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983);
Marbury Mgm't, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 717-18 (2d Cir.) (Meskill, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp.,
529 F. Supp. 770, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Difficulties arise in measuring the damage award for plaintiffs who buy prior to the
event and who sell after the event but prior to disclosure. See infra note 125.
118. See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1200 (8th Cir. 1978);
Foster v. Financial Technology Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975). See supra
note 6.
119. Cf. Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615, 621
(9th Cir. 1981) (action against broker for inducing customer to take on excess risk);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1981) (action against
broker for "churning" of account); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d
77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980) (action against broker for mismanagement of portfolio); Bird v.
Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1974) (restoring investment club "to the position it
would have occupied had the defalcations not occurred"); Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (action under
§ 11 of Securities Act of 1933 for misrepresentation in registration statement).
120. The variables used in Proposed Method 2 are defined as follows: R, = Return
on the stock; oc = alpha, a constant (y intercept); )3 = beta, or regression coefficient;
R = Return of the market; P, = estimated value of the stock on the date of disclo-
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The regression equation is derived as was done in Proposed Method
1. The unknown value under this method, however, is P1, the value of
the stock in the absence of the related event. Additionally, for Pro-
posed Method 2, P0 is the price of the stock on a date just prior to the
beginning of the fraud and is thus unaffected by it.12 ' The actual
return on the market during the period between the date selected
above for determining P. and the date of disclosure is inserted into the
equation, producing the estimated return on the stock during that
period. When equation 2 is solved for P, the result is:
P, = P0(1. + 1)-D (eq. 4).122
sure; P,, = market price of the stock prior to the fraud; and D = dividends payable to
stockholders during the period.
121. Courts employing this type of computation utilize the price on date of
purchase as P,. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,
586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See infra note 122. This is an alternative to the use of a date
prior to the fraud in an omission case, in which the stock price behaves normally
during the period prior to disclosure. In cases involving a misrepresentation, the date
prior to the misstatement and prior to potential leaks of the misstatement, cf. Petit,
supra note 76, at 1004 (investors' pre-announcement access to information has "antic-
ipation effect" on stock price), must be used as P0 , because the price on the date of
purchase has been distorted by the fraud.
The selection of a date to measure P0 will be subject to dispute between parties to a
lawsuit, because the prices on certain dates may result in more favorable damage
awards than others. The differences in the resulting damage awards should not be
significant if the regression equation, equation 1, is an accurate representation of the
normal behavior of the stock price. For methods of improving the accuracy of the
regression equation, see supra note 104, infra note 128 and accompanying text. Any
date prior to the commencement of the fraud may then be used, but the closer to the
commencement of the fraud, the better, as this will decrease the time interval
involved in the projections of estimated values of the stock.
122. This equation may be compared to the damage formula derived by the court
in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-88 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), and later refined by the court in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637
F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980).
The court in Feit used the percentage change in a market index to adjust the price
paid for the stock in order to factor out the effect of the market from the damage
award. 332 F. Supp. at 586; see 3A H. Blumenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate
Law § 8.26[4], at 8-76 (1982 ed.). The Rolf court refined this measure by using the
percentage change of an index of a more specialized group of stocks in order to
represent more accurately the effect of market forces on the stocks in question. 637
F.2d at 84 (Standard & Poor's Low-Priced Index). Proposed Method 2 may be
considered a further refinement of this type of measure as it utilizes the expected
return of the individual security as opposed to broad-based market-industry returns.
As one commentator has stated in this regard, "[tihere is no reason to use a sledge-
hammer when a laser can be constructed." Reder, supra note 2, at 1850.
The parameters of the equation used to estimate the return on the stock may be
tailored to meet a particular fact situation involving frauds on individuals. Because
beta is a measure of the stock's risk, this value may be adjusted to match the desired
level of risk in actions alleging that the plaintiff was induced to take on more risk
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P, is then compared with the actual price of the stock on the date of
disclosure, with the difference between the two being the damage
award. 12 3
D. Applying Proposed Method 2
Consider a situation similar to that of the oil company described in
Part I. In this example of a Type II fraud, the company owns two oil
fields, one with a 60 % chance of a successful strike and the other with
a 30 % chance of success. On February 28, 1966, the stock sells for $30
per share on the basis of these publicized estimates. After the close of
the market on that date, the company learns that a revised estimate
with respect to the first oil field shows only a 30 % chance of success.
This information should be released before the stock begins trading
the next day, March 1, but the company does not make such a release.
On March 25, the oil field in question is found to be totally dry, thus
making the land worthless. The company does not disclose this to the
public until April 1, 1966, prior to the opening of the market. The
company should have disclosed this information on the date that it
became aware of the dry field. Following the April 1 disclosure, the
price of the stock falls to $12 per share. The market price of the stock
during the month of March, the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index
for that month and the true value for the month may be seen in Chart
II.
The damage award using Proposed Method 2 for all plaintiffs who
purchased stock prior to the wells coming up dry, and who still hold
stock on the date of disclosure, is as follows. The first step is determin-
ing a date prior to the fraud when the price of the stock reflects all
information that the company has a duty to disclose and has accu-
rately released. 2 4 This price, which will be used as P0, is assumed to
equal $30 per share, the price on February 28. The return on the
than he would have otherwise been willing to accept. See Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus
& Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). This
value may be determined by examining the beta of the plaintiff's portfolio. See W.
Sharpe, supra note 60, at 156-57 (beta of portfolio is a weighted average of betas of
individual stocks). In situations in which a plaintiff has purchased a stock subject to a
fraud upon a limited number of people, so that the price paid is equal to the true
value of the security, the estimated return on the stock had the event not occurred
may be computed using the company's historical beta value. This of course assumes
that the event is not typical for the company, as these typical events are imputed into
the historical beta value.
123. Cf. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 637 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Rule 10b-5 action against broker for mismanagement of portfolio); Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (action
under § 11 of Securities Act of 1933 for misrepresentation in registration statement).
124. See supra note 121.
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market, Rm, is then computed for the period between February 28 and
the date of disclosure, April 1. This value would be
(89.94 - 91.22)/91.22 = -1.40 %.
The return on the stock, R,, is then computed using a regression
equation derived using data collected for the period prior to the fraud.
This equation is assumed to be B, = .0003 + 1.8Rm. 1 between
February 28 and April 1 is thus
.0003 + (1.8 x -.014) = -2.50%.
This value is then inserted into equation 4 to derive P,. The compu-
tation would be $30(-.025 + 1) = $29.25. The per share damage
award is the difference between the selling price on the date of
disclosure, $12, and the value estimated above, $29.25, or $17.25.125
E. Limitations in Computing Damage Awards
Concededly problems do exist with these proposed methods of com-
puting damage awards. They cannot account for multiple non-mar-
ket-related effects on the price of the stock,12 6 such as a fraud coupled
with the resignation of a key company executive. The proposed meth-
ods utilize the Market Model, which represents the return of a security
in terms of a limited number of variables-the return on the market
and the return on stocks in the industry. The result is that price
movements not attributable to these variables are automatically con-
sidered to have been caused by the fraud. 2 7 This problem, however,
125. The proposed method cannot compute the damage award for plaintiffs who
purchase and sell prior to the event that occurs in a Type II fraud. See supra note
113. The damage award for plaintiffs who buy prior to the event that causes a
decline in value, and sell after the event but prior to disclosure, poses an additional
problem. If the price/value spreads on the dates of purchase and sale are used, the
plaintiff will not be entitled to recover because the spread after the event is usually
larger than the spread on the date of purchase. The award in this situation should
therefore be the price/value spread on the date of purchase less the price/value spread
on the date of sale had the event not occurred. This separates the effect of the fraud
from that of the event and will compensate the plaintiff for those losses stemming
only from the initial fraud. The value representing the effect of the fraud alone
cannot be computed using the proposed methods. The basic valuation methods
described in Part II, section A must be used to estimate the value of the stock.
The plaintiff who purchases these shares following the event, but prior to disclo-
sure, will recover the spread between the price and true value of the stock on the date
of purchase. This recovery will compensate him for the difference in value due to the
event. Such a damage award may be computed using Proposed Method 1.
126. See Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 393-94. Proposed Method 1
cannot compute the damage award when the event has occurred prior to disclosure
of the fraud-a Type II fraud. Such an event is similar to a non-fraud related event;
both have affected the price subsequent to the disclosure, which is used to compute
the value on the date of purchase. The intrinsic method of valuation, because it is
subjective in nature, may attempt to account for these events. Nevertheless, the
inaccuracies of the intrinsic method will still be present. See supra notes 52-59 and
accompanying text.
127. See Actively Traded Securities, supra note 8, at 393-94.
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may be minhimized. If other non-market factors do affect the stock
during the period of the fraud, they may be included in the regression
equation through the use of additional variables. 1 8
An additional problem exists with respect to Type II frauds. In this
instance, the proposed methods cannot compute the true value of the
stock for dates before an event which precedes disclosure but relates to
the fraud. An out-of-pocket measure thus cannot be used because
Proposed Method 1, used to compute values on the date of purchase,
utilizes in its computation a price on a date subsequent to disclosure.
This price reflects the total impact of the fraud and the event on the
value of the stock, which is then discounted back to the date of
purchase. The value obtained will thus reflect the impact of both the
fraud and the event on the value of the stock. A proper out-of-pocket
measure, however, utilizes the price on the date of purchase, which
has only been affected by the fraud.
CONCLUSION
The procedures proposed to compute net economic loss provide a
superior alternative to the procedures currently used by courts. While
the proposed procedures do have some inherent problems, they are
insignificant when compared to those of the methods currently in use.
The adoption of accurate damage measurement procedures is impera-
tive. The acceptance of a formula to compute damages would immea-
surably reduce the conflict on the damage issue. Because potential
disputes would be limited to the derivation of the equations, the scope
of expert testimony would be greatly diminished. In most situations
the computations could be done by a court-appointed special master
or expert, leaving only the issue of liability in the hands of the trier of
fact.
Jared Tobin Finkelstein
128. See J. Aber, Beta Coefficients and Models of Security Return 81-82 (1973).
These additional variables may include such factors as institutional shares traded
during the period, the inventory of the stock specialist, or the resignation of a high
level executive. The additional variables need not be numerical. Dummy variables
may be used to account for non-fraud related events that cannot be measured with
numbers. The variable will take on a 0 or 1 value for the existence or non-existence of
a particular event. For example, a variable may be included for each president of a
company that will take on a value of I during the particular president's tenure and 0
when he is not in office. These variables are included in the regression analysis to
derive equation 1. See T. Wonnacott & R. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics 385-90
(3d ed. 1977). The cost of the inclusion of these additional variables is the initiation
of disputes during litigation over the exact variables to be included. The inclusion or
exclusion of certain variables will affect the estimated return on the stock, R,. The
benefits of including these variables are determined on a case-by-case basis, depend-
ing upon the existence of external events that may reduce the validity of the simple















































































































* Market prices assume a high correlation to market returns.
** Data obtained from Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Index
Record 179 (1982 ed.).







Date Market Price* S&P 500* Value*** Cause *
2/28/66 $30.00 91.22 $30.00
3/1 $29.375 90.06 $24.05
3/2 $28.75 89.15 $23.62
3/3 $29.00 89.47 $23.77
3/4 $28.875 89.24 $23.66
3/7 $28.125 88.04 $23.10
3/8 $28.25 88.18 $23.16
3/9 $28.75 88.96 $23.53
3/10 $29.50 88.96 $23.53
3/11 $29.25 88.85 $23.47
3/14 $28.75 87.85 $23.01
3/15 $28.25 87.35 $22.78
3/16 $28.625 87.86 $23.01
3/17 $28.875 88.17 $23.16
3/18 $29.00 88.53 $23.32
3/21 $29.25 89.20 $23.64
3/22 $29.50 89.46 $23.76
3/23 $29.125 89.13 $23.61
3/24 $29.25 89.29 $23.68
3/25 $29.375 89.54 $23.80
3/28 $29.625 89.62 $11.92
3/29 $29.25 89.27 $11.84
3/30 $29.00 88.78 $11.72
3/31 $29.125 89.23 $11.83
4/1 $12.00 89.94 $12.00 $29.251
• Market prices assume a high correlation to the return on the
market.
• * Data obtained from Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Index
Record 179 (1982 ed.).
• ** These values were obtained using Proposed Method 1 and as-
sume that the value of two oil fields with a 30 % chance of
success is $24 per share on April 1. The values between March 1
and March 25 cannot be computed using Proposed Method 1 in
an actual fraud. See supra note 113. They are presented simply
to enable comparison of the two methods.
• *** Computed using Proposed Method 2.
